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Abstract—In this paper we consider service-oriented applica-
tions composed of component services provided by different, eco-
nomically independent service providers. As in all composite ap-
plications, the component services are composed and configured
to meet requirements for the composite application. However,
in a field experiment of composite service-oriented applications
wef found that, although the services as actually delivered by
the service providers meet their requirements, there is still a
mismatch across service providers due to unstated assumptions,
and that this mismatch causes an incorrect composite application
to be delivered to end-users. Identifying and analyzing these
initially unstated assumptions turns requirements engineering for
service-oriented applications into risk analysis.
In this paper, we describe a field experiment with an
experimental service-oriented homecare system, in which
unexpected behavior of the system turned up unstated
assumptions about the contributing service providers. We then
present an assumptions-driven risk identification method that
can help identifying these risks, and we show how we applied
this method in the second iteration of the field experiment. The
method adapts some techniques from problem frame diagrams
to identify relevant assumptions on service providers. The
method is informal, and takes the ”view from nowhere” in that
it does not result in a specification of the component services,
but for every component service delivers a set of assumptions
that the service must satisfy in order to contribute to the overall
system requirements. We end the paper with a discussion of
generalizability of this method.
Index Terms—Risks, Requirements engineering, Composite
applications, Dynamic service provisioning, Homecare systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problem
To reduce development cost in todays’ competitive envi-
ronment businesses use Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA).
With SOA, programmers can compose applications by reusing
existing services provided by different organizations. A com-
posite application can be built without knowing the internal
implementation mechanisms of the services.
A composite service-oriented application composed of com-
ponent services provided by independent providers, is imple-
mented as a network of actors (including service providers
and end-users) that, as a whole, must satisfy application
requirements, that in turn are motivated by overall goals.
Each of the contributing service providers makes assump-
tions about its environment (consisting of the other component
service providers, and the end-users) and delivers a service
that, if those assumptions were correct, would satisfy the
specification of that component service. In practice, these
assumptions are mostly unstated, and some of them are incor-
rect, or at least mutually inconsistent across different service
providers.
In a field experiment of composite applications, which will
be described later on, these unstated assumptions created
unexpected behavior of the applications, which violated the
application requirements. The interactions between component
services that made incorrect assumptions about their environ-
ment had been unforeseen, and were unwanted.
This problem does not simply go away by specifying in de-
tail what each component service must do, and then matching
provided services with this specification. The specifications
of component services are often not fully available to the
programmer creating the composite application.
Component services are subject to many requirements in
addition to those that derive from one particular application.
This has influenced their internal implementation decisions,
their interpretation of our requirements on their service, and
the assumptions they implicitly make on their environment (i.e.
the other component services and the end-users). This leads
to a situation in which the service providers and application
programmer all believe, mistakenly, that provided services are
required services.
The unpredictability of composing services provided by
independent providers increases with dynamic service provi-
sioning. In dynamic service provisioning, a composite appli-
cation can be reconfigured. Dynamicity increases the range of
possible application behaviors and therefore also increases the
range of possible unexpected interactions between component
services.
In this paper we focus on dynamic service provisioning
for safety-critical systems, in particular home care systems
in which the life and well-being of patients are at risk [1].
The goal of home care systems is to allow elderly to live
an independent life as long as possible (and to save costs
at the same time), by providing them with smart self-care
medical aids. It is important for these systems to avoid
unexpected behavior and so requirements engineering for these
systems contains a risk assessment. In the literature, different
definitions of risks have been given in different domains [2],
[3], [4]. We will stay close to the dictionary definition of risk
by defining it as ”the possibility of loss or disadvantage to
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end-users due to composite application behavior”. The loss or
disadvantage to end-users of an application can happen when
that application either acts in a way that is not desired by the
end-users, or fails to act when it should have responded to
environmental changes.
We will not assume that this risk is quantifiable. In home
care, care-givers such as nurses are aware of safety risks but
cannot quantify them.
If all the assumptions for all possible environmental changes
can be stated explicitly during design time, and all provided
services can be shown to satisfy the composite application’s
requirements under these assumptions, there would be no
need to do a risk assessment. The first condition is not met
in dynamic service provisioning in general, and the second
condition is not met because of unstated assumptions and
specifications.
B. Objective
In this paper, we propose a method to identify potential
risks of using a dynamic service provisioning approach due to
incomplete assumptions made, by the application programmer
or by independent service providers, on component services.
Our method emphasizes identifying the various require-
ments on the service providers and how these requirements
can affect their assumptions. The method is based on some
elements of the Jackson’s problem frame technique [5] and on
Seater & Jackson’s extension of this [6]. However, in contrast
to Seater & Jackson’s extension, the method is informal and
can be applied without any tool support. A second important
difference is that we do not use the method to derive a system
specification. Our method assumes a ”view from nowhere” in
which assumptions on component services are derived from
application requirements.
C. Related Work
Garlan et al. [7], [8] have identified the problem of incorrec-
t/conflicting assumptions for building a system out of existing
subsystems. As one of the solutions to alleviate this problem,
they have proposed to make these assumption explicit. In our
approach, we aim to make the assumptions on the component
services as explicit as possible. To do so, we investigate
how and why a service provider might interpret the implicit
parts of an assumption differently, and how these different
interpretations could lead to a risk.
Knowledge Acquisition in automated specification
(KAOS) [9] emphasized on identifying obstacles that prevent
the achievement of a goal such as, safety, security, or
user-friendliness goals. If these obstacles are unrecognized
or underestimated, the requirements on the system and its
environment would be inadequate and incomplete. Then the
system is exposed to a variety of risks. The obstacle analysis
in KAOS is formal and can be applied for any types of goals.
While the ARM method is informal and limited to the safety
and security risks.
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) [10], identifies the risks which would happen
if a component fails and prioritizes them based on their
severity, frequency of occurrence, and detectability. However,
risks of incomplete assumptions are not limited to the
failure of one of the component services. In the cases for
which our method is intended, component services work
properly with respect to their corresponding assumptions, but
incomplete or incorrect assumptions causes a risk. This is
the core observation that motivated the STPA hazard analysis
method [11], [12]. However, the STPA approach is designed
for a distributed system with dedicated components and
one actor who is responsible for the entire system design,
while we have a provisioning platform with no dedicated
component services, and we should identify the risks based
on incompletely specified services offered by independent
service providers.
Argumentation technique combined with the Jackson’s
problem frame can be used to investigate the security re-
quirements on components of a system and the assumptions
behind them[13]. However, ARM emphasizes on identifying
the mismatch among several component services due to their
unstated assumptions instead of focusing on one component
service and its corresponding assumptions.
HAZards and OPerability studies (HAZOP) [14] identifies a
set of risks that can arise due to deviation of the system from
the intended design specification by a set of parameters and
guide words, such as ‘more’, ‘late’ and ‘no’. The guide words
of HAZOP are not directly applicable to identification of risks
of incomplete assumptions. Our work is similar to an extended
version of HAZOP for programmable electronic systems [15].
However, we tailor risk identification even further to our
specific problem domain, as we investigate how requirements
of a service provider can affect its corresponding assumptions
which are represented as natural-language-like descriptions.
ARM is similar to the RISA method for identifying se-
curity requirements in a network of components [16]. How-
ever, RISA focuses on security requirements and uses public
databases of security vulnerabilities, where we focus on safety
and use methods derived from safety engineering. And where
RISA extends problem frames with the Toulmin argumentation
technique, we use an informal reasoning approach based
geared to sharing the risk assessment with stakeholders who
are not computer experts.
Human factors such as end-users exceptional behaviors,
have been considered for identifying risks [17]. Similarly, we
have investigated the risks of incorrect assumptions on end-
users in our previous paper [18]. We consider our proposed
method as complementary to the existing risk management
approaches to identify new risks. Moreover, we do not talk
about risks prioritization since it can be done using the existing
approaches.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, we define a generic dynamic service provisioning system
including its functionalities and actors. In Section III, we
describe a homecare system field experiment that showed
unexpected behaviors due to unstated assumptions. In Sec-
tion IV, we describe our assumption-based risk identification
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method (ARM). Section V shows how we applied ARM in
the second iteration of the field experiment, and the risks that
were identified. Finally, in Section VI, we discuss the results
and lessons learned from the field experiment.
II. DYNAMIC SERVICE PROVISIONING PLATFORM
In our home care platform, application logic can be defined
by a service plan. A service plan consists of one or more
service building blocks and describes the configuration and
composition of instances of these service building blocks with
respect to run-time circumstances.
A service building block (SBB), in turn, defines a set of
functionalities in the abstract level that can be implemented
by alternative component services. For instance a SBB of
medicine dispenser can be implemented by different medicine
dispenser devices which might be provided by different ven-
dors. The service plan specifies the behavior of a composite
application at runtime by specifying which component service
will be selected for a SBBs and how the selected service will
be configured and orchestrated [19] .
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application
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Fig. 1. Actors in a dynamic service provisioning system
Our service provisioning platform is dynamic. We define
a dynamic service provisioning platform as an adaptive, tai-
lorable and evolvable application service provisioning plat-
form.
An application is adaptive if it monitors foreseen changes
and reacts to them based on predefined application logic. For
example, our application can monitor the blood pressure of an
elderly. The application may adapt its behaviour by stopping
the current activity and sending an alert to nurses if the blood
pressure goes too high/low.
By a tailorable platform we mean that an end-user monitors
for changes, and adapts the application behavior by reconfigu-
ration. For example, if an elderly develops hearing impairment
over time, a nurse can increase the the default volume of
audio reminders to remind the elderly to measure his/her blood
pressure.
By an evolvable provisioning platform we mean that the
platform facilitates the manual update of application logic
(i.e., reducing required manpower and system resources) to
address unforeseen changes. For example, after introducing
our system in the field experiment (see Section III), we found
that a care-receiver measured his blood pressure much earlier
than expected, at 3 AM instead of its scheduled time at 8
AM. Then, if the blood pressure measurement value is too
high/low, the application should send the alert immediately
at 3 AM. However, the application only starts just before 8
AM. To address this unforeseen change, the programmer of
the application should adapt the application logic.
In our dynamic service provisioning system, as illustrated
in Fig. 1, a service provisioning platform composes dif-
ferent types of component services: infrastructure services,
application services (provided by third-parties) and internal
application services (provided by the platform). Infrastructure
services are application-scenario independent while applica-
tion services are used for a specific application scenario.
In addition, there are stakeholders such as programmers,
domain experts and end-users. In our case, domain experts
are nurses, or more generally care-givers. To decouple the
concerns, we assume that there is a separate tailoring platform
that takes care of the service plan creation and tailoring,
and eventually deploys the service plan to the provisioning
platform for the execution.
The end-users use the composite applications running on top
of the platform. In our case, they are people needing homecare
applications, such as patients or some elderly people, generally
called care-receivers in this paper. End-users interact with the
applications either directly with the platform through its inter-
nal component services or through the 3rd-party component
services. They are not aware of this difference.
A domain-expert can be an end-user too if the application
is supposed to interact with him/her during its execution. This
decentralized architecture is not restricted to homecare systems
and we regard it as representative of all decentralized service-
oriented systems.
The domain expert can define the behavior of the application
by assigning values to the configuration parameters of the
service plan. In response, the composite application updates
its behaviour based on its service plan. However, addressing
unforeseen changes might need new configuration parameters,
values or even new orchestrations. This requires IT-knowledge
that the domain expert usually does not have. In this case, we
assume a programmer who can do arbitrary IT-specific tasks
to define or modify the application logic. We assume that
the programmer acquires the requirements from the domain
expert and accordingly updates the application logic. The
programmer must also update the tailoring platform to enable
the domain expert to use the new/modified service plan.
III. OUR FIELD EXPERIMENT IN THE HOMECARE DOMAIN
We conducted a field experiment at Orbis, a care-institution
in the Netherlands 1. This institution consists of residential
blocks where elderly can live and receive care services that
are provided by professional care-givers. The aim of this
institution is to provide round-the-clock services to their care-
receivers and at the same time to enable them to live an
independent life as much and as long as possible. As part
of the U-Care (User-tailored Care services platform) project2,
1http://www.orbisconcern.nl/
2http://www.utwente.nl/ewi/ucare/
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we developed a prototype of an IT-based homecare service
provisioning platform [19].
The field experiment has been done in two iterations of two
months each, with one month in between to improve existing
applications and to add new applications. The problems that
we have faced in the first iteration motivated us to design the
ARM risk identification method, which we then applied in the
second iteration of the field experiment.
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Fig. 2. Part of the architecture of the U-Care system.
Fig. 2 shows some of the infrastructure and application
services of the U-Care system. It is an instance of the
architecture shown in Fig. 1. More details and justification
of this architecture has been given elsewhere [20], [19].
In this section, we explain the vital-sign monitoring (VsM)
application of the U-care system to motivate the need for
the ARM method. In Section V, we explain the medication
monitoring (MdM) application to validate the ARM method
in the second iteration of our field experiment.
Fig. 2 shows all the component services which are employed
by VsM and MdM applications. There are 3rd-party applica-
tion services which are used by the VsM application: calendar,
reminder, vital-sign measurement and vital-sign reporting and
medicine dispenser. The medicine dispenser service is only
used by the MdM application and will be described later.
The calendar, reminder and vital-sign reporting services are
provided by the Biomedical Signals and Systems (BSS) group
of the University of Twente3. These services are running on
end-user Tablet PCs available to the care-givers and care-
receivers.
3http://www.utwente.nl/ewi/bss/
The tailoring platform is provided by the Information Sys-
tem (IS) group of the university of Twente4. It is running as an
application on end-users Tablet PC available to the care-givers.
If the application logic needs to be updated manually to
address unforeseen changes, a programmer of IS modifies
the application logic and accordingly, updates the tailoring
platform. The tailoring platform, through the deployment
service of the provisioning platform, deploys a schedule to
the calendar service based on the deployed service plan.
The vital-sign measurement service is provided by the
MobiHealth5 company. Care-receivers use a vital-sign mea-
surement device at home, which is connected to a server
in MobiHealth. The MobiHealth server forwards vital-sign
measurement values (e.g., blood pressure), which it receives
from the measurement devices, to the context service.
We also show an internal application of the provisioning
platform. The alert service sends an alert to a care-giver’s
PDA. This internal application service and the infrastructure
services are running on top of the infrastructure which are
provided by Orbis as the care center in our field experiment.
Orbis also provides communication infrastructure for the
3rd-party application services and the PDA/Tablet PC used by
the care-givers and care-receivers.
The U-Care system architecture illustrates some of the prob-
lems with the composition of services provided by independent
providers. We explain this using a scenario in which Jan, a
care-receiver, measures his vital signs at home, and in which
Nancy is the care-giver responsible for Jan. Nancy creates the
vital sign monitoring (VsM) service plan for Jan. The service
plan helps Jan to measure his vital-signs (e.g., weight) on time.
After the service plan deployment, Jan can see his schedule
for vital-sign measurement on the calendar service running
on his Tablet PC. The VsM application starts based on a
the scheduled time, and reminds Jan, possibly several times,
to measure his vital-signs such as blood pressure. Vital-sign
measurement is actually an interaction with MobiHealth, who
notifies the provisioning platform of the measurement. If Jan
does not measure it on time, or if his vital-signs are not in
the normal range, the application sends an alert to Nancy. To
monitor whether a vital-sign measurement is not on time, the
U-Care system uses the vital-sign reporting service provided
by BSS.
This application was tested in the first iteration of the field
experiment. The test revealed several problems, of which the
following three are illustrative. Fig. 3 zooms in on the part
of the architecture of Fig. 2 that supports the VsM scenario.
Each box represents a service which is provided by a service
provider mentioned between the parentheses. To explain the
problems, the internal implementation components of each
service are also shown. Fig. 3 shows that MobiHealth gives
a vital-sign measurement device and an smart phone to the
care-receiver. The smart phone communicates with the mea-
surement device by Bluetooth and forwards the measurement
4http://www.utwente.nl/ewi/is/
5http://www.mobihealth.com/
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data to a web server. Then the web server of MobiHealth,
forwards the data to the context service of Orbis running on
an application server (i.e., App server). Orbis stores the data
and then forwards the data to the vital-sign reporting service
of BSS. This service is running on an application server that
communicates with Nancy’s Tablet PC.
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Fig. 3. The part of the U-Care architecture supporting the VsM scenario.
We classify the problems into three kinds, so that we can
refer to them later.
• Service availability problem: The Orbis application server
is down for maintenance every night at 3 a.m. Data
received in downtime would be lost. However, unexpect-
edly, some care-receivers measured their blood pressure
around 3 a.m.
• Data transportation problem: The Bluetooth connection
between the measurement device and the smart phone
of the care-receivers resends data when the sender does
not receive an acknowledgment on time. This turned out
to happen sometimes, and then leads to data duplication
not discovered by the rest of the network, i.e. all other
services did not recognize that data was duplicated.
• Data storage problem: All the data must be hashed
before transportation among the component services. Due
to hashing algorithm used by MobiHealth, the hashed
care-receiver’s ID (identification number) exceeds the
maximum size of care-receiver’s ID defined by BSS.
Therefore, Orbis faced an error when it forwards the
hashed care-receiver’s ID to BSS. Because BSS can not
store them and sends an error back to Orbis.
These cases of architectural mismatch can be traced by
lack of knowledge of each others internal implementations and
operational processes, as well as lack of knowledge about how
end-users behave. Some implementation decisions are made
for good reasons, others are bad decisions, but none of them
are under the control of a central coordinator.
IV. THE PROPOSED RSK IDENTIFICATION METHOD
In this section we first give an overall description of the
method, using the VsM application as an example. We then
provide step-by-step instructions on how to apply the method
in general.
A. Overall Description
We assume that our risk identification method is used by
the owner of the composite application. The owner is the
actor specifies the requirements for, and is responsible for the
delivery of the composite application.
We do not assume that the owner is in charge of any
of the component services used to compose the composite
application. Therefore, the owner cannot specify or implement
any of these services.
The owner has the ”view from nowhere” because he does
not take any of the component service providers’ point of view.
The owner is responsible for selecting component service
providers, and composing them into a composite application
that satisfies his composite application requirements. To dis-
charge of its responsibility, the owner must be able to give an
argument of the form:
If service providers S1, ..., Sn behave like this:
A1, ..., An, respectively, then the composite appli-
cation satisfies its requirements.
This is called a frame concern by Jackson [21], but because
we are reasoning about components services and not about
problem domains, we call it a contribution argument. Note that
instead of requirements on service provider Si, the contribu-
tion argument makes assumptions about the service provider
meeting his requirements. We therefore have two types of
assumptions: assumptions made by service providers about
the environment of their service, and assumptions made by
the application owner (A1, ..., An) as part of his contribution
argument. The assumptions made by the owner take the form
of descriptions of the behavior of the components as inferred
or desired by the owner.
Fig. 4 extends the architecture diagram of Fig. 3 with an-
notations that illustrate parts of the contribution argument. We
borrow from problem frame diagrams the notation to represent
requirements in a dashed ellipse, connected by dashed lines
to the actors who are the subject of the requirements. Fig. 4
contains the requir description ement R1 on the care-giver and
care-receiver:
R1 The care-receiver shall provide vital-sign values to the
care-giver according to the service plan for vital-sign
measurement. The care-giver shall respond to situations
in which the care-receiver does not follow the service
plan, and situations where the measurements are outside
the safe range as stated in the service plan.
This requirement can be fulfilled if the care-giver is per-
manently present at the care-receiver’s location. The U-care
system is introduced to fulfill the requirement even when the
care-giver is not permanently present.
The owner of the vital-sign monitoring (VsM) application
service has designed an architecture of independent service
providers, and translated requirement R1 into a set of assump-
tions about services provided by these service providers, such
that these assumptions jointly satisfy R1. The contribution
argument now becomes
If the service providers in the architecture of Fig. 4 satisfy
the assumptions listed in Fig. 4, the composite application
satisfies R1.
Because the owner is responsible for more U-Care appli-
cations, this architecture may contain components that are
not optimal for implementing R1. For example, a simpler
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Fig. 4. The network for requirement 1 to be satisfied by vital-sign monitoring (VsM application).
architecture from the standpoint of implementing R1 only,
would be to have the vital-sign reporting service be provided
by MobiHealth instead of by BSS. However, there are other
requirements that call for an independent vital-sign reporting
service, which motivates the choice made in Fig. 4.
Given an architecture, assumptions are placed on its com-
ponents so that the contribution argument can be given. This
corresponds to adding ”breadcrumbs” (assumptions) in terms
of Seater & Jackson’s method to transform a requirement into
a machine specification [6].
The assumptions on service providers are assumptions on
interfaces of the service providers. An assumption listed under
the box representing the service provider is about its interface
represented by the line (e.g., in Fig. 4, assumptioni2 is on “in-
terface i2” of “vital-sign measurement device”). Assumptions
made by the composite application owner are not specifications
to be implemented by a service provider. Rather, the owner
has to check if the service provider has the capability to
satisfy the assumptions made on it. The service provider has
a range of possible behaviors that we call its capabilities.
An actor uses its capabilities to provide services, and usually
does so in the context of different composite applications. For
example, MobiHealth provides services in many other contexts
in addition to the U-care context, and does so with the same
services as those contributed in the U-Care system.
Every capability implies a limitation: every range of pos-
sible behaviors implies that there are behaviors not in this
range. Fig. 4 lists some limitations of capabilities by a dashed
oval box, connected to the assumption that they qualify. The
assumption states a capability that the actor is assumed to have,
and the limitation is a limitation of the actor’s capabilities that
causes it to fail to meet the assumption. Note that the actual
capabilities of an actor are nowhere stated; they are unknown
to the owner of the composite application. Rather, the owner
states an assumption about these capabilities. A limitation
shown in the diagram states a property of the capability that the
actor actually has. It tells us why this actor, with this limitation,
fails to meet the assumption. The diagram in Fig. 4 shows four
limitations, which are four reasons why this architecture with
these service providers, fails to meet requirement R1. In other
words, the diagram shows four risks of this particular network.
Mitigating these risks involves a choice between accepting
the risks (occasional failure on the system), transferring them
(taking out insurance against failure), avoiding them (dropping
requirement R1), removing it (replacing a service by one that
satisfies the assumptions on it) or compensating it (changing
the capability of some service provider so that the limitation
stops being a case for failing to meet R1). Risk mitigation
falls outside of the scope of this paper.
Fig. 4 also lists the reasons why some actors have some
limitations in their capabilities. The diagram shows two re-
quirements on MobiHealth and one on Orbis that are ex-
traneous to the U-Care project. The actors are subject to
these requirements independently from whether or not they
participate in U-Care.
These requirements are themselves motivated by higher-
level goals, namely privacy laws in the homecare domain [22]
and business goals (cost-effectiveness). The reasons explain
why some actors made some implementation choices, that
caused the limitations noted in the Fig. 4. They also make
clear that these choices will not be changed just to satisfy a
U-Care requirement.
Finally, note that the three requirements listed for Mobi-
Health and Orbis are context-free in the sense that they refer
to one actor only. This explains why these requirements are
not necessarily mentioned in discussions with other actors or
with the owner of the application.
We next classify the limitations that we have found in
the first iteration of our field experiment into three kinds,
illustrated earlier by three problems.
• Service availability limitation: A service provider has a
limitation on its capability to a service always running.
• Data transportation limitation: A service provider has
a limitation on its data transportation capability, such
data transportation assumptions made by the composite
application owner are not satisfied. (This assumption
could be: no later than delivery, no earlier than delivery,
at most once delivery, exactly once delivery etc.)
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• Data storage limitation: The capability of a service to
add, store or delete data may differ from that assumed
by the owner of the composite application.
We claim that these are all the limitations that the owner
should look for when doing a risk assessment.
B. Step-by-step Description of ARM
Our assumption-based risk assessment method ARM con-
sists of three steps. We assume that the requirements are
known and that an architecture for the composite application
has been designed in which service providers provide the
component services. We now identify relevant assumptions,
and search for risks that the requirement will not be satisfied.
1) Translate the main requirements into assumptions on
the interfaces of the network actors. This is done by
constructing a contribution argument in which the as-
sumptions on the interfaces of service providers are
listed, needed for ensuring that the composite application
satisfies its requirement. In our experience we find this
step the most difficult one. In our field experiment, the
programmer with the help of the service plan (given
by a nurse), and service specification and end-user
manual (given by the service providers) writes down
these assumptions. How complete and accurate are they?
This is a difficult question and its answer is outside of
the scope of this paper.
2) Explore the capabilities and limitations of each service
provider to satisfy the assumptions on its interface. That
is, we try to identify capabilities that a service provider
should have in order to satisfy the assumptions on its
interface. These capabilities are in correspondence with
the three types of limitations which we have faced in the
first iteration of our field experiment. They are mainly
related to how a service provider manipulates data.
Here are sets of questions that we have found useful
to ask about each service provider, in order to assess
whether it has the assumed capabilities.
a) Service availability questions. What are the operat-
ing systems of the internal components used by the
provided service? How (and how often) are they
maintained? What are the limitations of employed
software/hardware? For instance: do they need to
restart for maintenance and if yes, how long does it
take and how often? How will a software/hardware
component be updated (e.g., on-the-fly)? Do they
have a second power supply? How long can they
continue on the second power supply? If they use
a battery, how long can they go on battery power?
b) Data transportation questions. How are the in-
ternal components connected to each other? How
reliable are services and the interconnections (e.g.,
error handling, packet lost, duplicate packet, ..)?
What are the limitations of employed networks
and networks protocols? For instance: do they
guarantee the messages will be transfered? Be sent
maximum once? Do they send an acknowledge?
What happens if before receiving an acknowledge
the connection is lost?
c) Data storage questions. How are the internal data
stored? What are the primary/foreign keys? How
are these data added/edited/deleted? What are the
limitations for storing/internal transportation the
data values? For instance: does the provider have
the permission to store the data? How long can
the provider keep the data? What is the minimum
level of encryption for storing and transporting the
data? Is data hashing sufficient? Can the provider
find out who is the owner of the data? Can the
provider make a distinction between data based on
their owner?
Questions like these can be answered by inspecting the
contract with a service provider, or, if more detailed
information is needed, by inspecting technical documen-
tation provided by a service provider or by interviewing
experts inside the service provider organization.
The answers for these questions might be motivated by
the extraneous requirements on the service providers.
3) Explore in which way each limitation identified in the
previous step could cause the service provider fail to
meet an assumption.
One way to do this is to change keywords in the capa-
bility descriptions in a HAZOP-like manner [14] [15].
The assumptions are written in natural language, and
so variations in these assumptions can be derived by
adding or removing some words (e.g., adverb) in the
assumptions.
For the VsM application, limitationi2 and limitationi5 1
could be changed into corresponding assumptions as
follows:
• Assumptioni2′ : The device might send any vital-
signs that is measured to smart phone more than
once.
• Assumptioni5′ : The Orbis server might call BSS
web service to notify a vital-sign more than once.
By knowing these two affected assumptions, we could
have identified the Data transportation problem of du-
plication data before the field experiment. Since it is
not a serious risk, we could inform care-givers for such
application behaviour and asking them to take care of
that (transferring the risk.)
As another example, the limitationi4 and limitationi5 2
could be changed into corresponding assumptions as
follows:
• Assumptioni4′ : The web server calls context service
to notify a vital-sign and delete the data.
• Assumptioni5” : The Orbis server calls BSS App
server to notify a vital-sign not during the main-
tenance.
By knowing these two affected assumptions, we could
have identified the Service availability problem and the
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risk of losing vital-sign measurement data did not occur.
It is a serious risk and either Orbis has to remove
limitationi5 2 or MobiHealth has to remove limitationi4.
V. APPLYING THE RISK IDENTIFICATION METHOD
In the second iteration of our field experiment, we ap-
plied the ARM method to the medication monitoring (MdM)
application scenario. In this scenario, the care-receiver uses
medicines made available by a medicine dispenser provided
by the Innospense company6. As in the first iteration, we use
“Nancy” as short-hand for the care-giver, and “Jan” for the
care-receiver.
Nancy creates a service plan, using the tailoring platform,
to help Jan to take his medication on time (see Fig. 2).
Similar to the VsM application, if Jan does not take his
medication, the MdM application will send a reminder to him,
possibly several times (shown on his Tablet PC). If Jan has not
taken his medication after a tailored number of reminders, the
application will send an alert to Nancy (shown on her PDA).
Fig. 5 zooms in one the part of the architecture of Fig. 2 that
supports the MdM application scenario. It shows three sub-
networks. In sub-network (1), the medicine dispenser, which
is located at Jan’s home, communicates with the web portal
of Innospense and forwards the timestamp of Jan taking his
medication. The web portal then forwards the timestamp to
the context service running on an application server of Orbis.
Medicine
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App
server
Context service (Orbis)
App
server
Reminder 
message
Context service (Orbis)
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server
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Reminder service (BSS)
Care-
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server
Alert
message
Context service (Orbis)
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server
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Alert service (Orbis)
Care-
giver
(1)
(2)
(3)
Fig. 5. Part of the U-Care architecture supporting the MdM scenario.
In sub-network (2), the context server checks at the sched-
uled time for medication if it has recently received the times-
tamp from Jan’s medicine dispenser. If no timestamp has been
received, the context service sends a context-aware reminder
message (e.g., if Jan is outside his home, the reminder message
would be: “please go home and take your medicine”) to
the reminder service of BSS. This service is running on an
application server that communicates with Jan’s Tablet PC.
In sub-network (3), if the context service has not received a
timestamp from Innospense after having sent several reminder
messages, it will send a context-aware alert message (e.g. “Jan
is outside his home and has not taken his medicine yet”) to
the alert service. This service runs on the application server
of Orbis that forwards the alert to Nancy’s PDA.
6http://www.innospense.com
The MdM application must satisfy requirement R2 on the
care-giver and care-receiver:
R2 The care-receiver shall take a medicine from the dispenser
at the scheduled time according to his service plan. The
care-giver shall respond to situations in which the care-
receiver does not follow his service plan.
Fig. 6 contains R2 and extends the architecture diagram of
Fig. 5. This figure is explained through the steps of the ARM
method.
Step 1: Translate the main requirements into assumptions
on the interfaces of the network actors. Based on the service
plan, the programmer as the owner of the MdM application,
drew the network of actors for the MdM application according
to its service plan. As elaborated in a previous paper [19], the
service plan contains a BPMN (Business process modeling
language)-like part that shows the combination of the compo-
nent services.
Then, the programmer wrote down the assumptions on
capabilities of each actor. In this case, the end-user manual
of Innospense turned out to be useful, since it specified the
external behaviour of the medicine dispenser.
As the figure shows, if the service providers satisfy
assumptionsi8,i9,i10,i11,i12, Jan will receive a reminder if he
forgot to take his medicine. Besides, if the service providers
satisfy assumptionsi8,i9,i13,i14,i15, Nancy will receive an
alert message if Jan does not take his medicine after several
reminder messages. Together, these assumptions fulfill
requirement R2 even when the care-giver is not permanently
present.
Step 2: Explore the capabilities and limitations of each
service provider to satisfy the assumptions on its interface. As
an example, based on interviews with the service providers we
identified this requirement for Innospense:
RI1 Innospense aims to reduce its communication costs be-
tween devices.
This requirement in turn motivated Innospense to make some
implementation decisions. We uncovered these decisions by
asking the three Service availability, Data transportation, and
Data storage questions. Innospense limits the communication
between its web portal (located in the company) and the
medicine dispenser device (located at home) to some specific
time granularity. As such, limitationi8 is imposed.
Step 3: Explore in which way each limitation identified
in the previous step could cause the service provider fail to
meet an assumption. To continue our example, we found the
following impact of limitationi8 on assumptionsi8:
• Assumptioni8′ :
The device sends the timestamp with a maximum delay
of m minutes after the medicine is taken.
Based on the affected assumption, we identified the
following scenarios and risks:
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Fig. 6. The network for requirement 2 to be satisfied by medication monitoring (MdM) application.
Risk 1 for assumptioni8′ : we can think of a scenario in
which Jan receives a reminder even though he has taken his
medication. This happens when the scheduled time for taking
the medicine expires before the timestamp is received by the
context service, due to the delay introduced by the medicine
dispenser.
Risk 2 for assumptioni8′ : we can think of a scenario in
which Nancy receives an alert even though Jan has taken his
medication. This happens when the scheduled time for sending
an alert is reached (after sending the last reminder and) before
the timestamp is received by the context service, due to the
delay introduced by the medicine dispenser.
There are other assumptions, limitations and risks in addi-
tion to those mentioned above, but these have been omitted for
brevity. We indeed completed the risk assessment for the MdM
application before the second iteration of our field experiment.
Therefore, the provisioning of the MdM application was more
reliable than the VsM application in the first iteration of our
field experiment.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER WORK
We have presented and illustrated a method to identify risks
in a decentralized system that is composed of component
services provided by independent providers. Each component
service provider is responsible for the way it provides its
service, and the owner of the composite application cannot
demand a component service provider to provision a dedi-
cated service. In this situation, the owner of the composite
service does not specify component services, but must make
assumptions about them, that reflect agreements made with
every component service provider.
The end-users are not computer experts, which limits the
kind of assumptions we can make on end-users. At the same
time our system is safety-critical because a failure to meet sys-
tem requirements may harm end-users. Riskiness is increased
by dynamicity in the form of adaptability, tailorability and
evolvability of the system.
The ARM method starts out with the requirements on a
composite application and the component service network
used to meet these requirements. It proceeds by listing the
assumptions about each component service, checking whether
the component service provider really has the capability to
meet these assumptions. Then, it explores the impact of
any limitations of these capabilities for the ability of each
component service provider to meet its assumptions, and hence
of the service network to meet the overall requirement. Any
risks identified this way are managed by accepting, avoiding,
transferring or reducing the risk. Mitigation is typically done
in agreement with the stakeholders but is outside the scope of
the ARM method.
We have developed and used the method in a field ex-
periment of a homecare system. This test showed that the
method can be used and delivers useful results in this case.
A possible threat to internal validity could be that the risk
identification actually was successful, not because ARM was
used, but because we (in particular the first author) were aware
of the risks in some other way already. However, this was not
the case: The first author was not aware of the risks identified
in between the two iterations before he used the ARM method.
An important threat to external validity is that perhaps
we (the first author) were able to use this method in this
project, but that this is not repeatable in other projects, neither
by other people nor by the first author himself. Usability
by other people in other projects must be shown in future
experiments, by giving this method to other risk assessors in
similar projects. The method is arguably repeatable by the first
author in similar projects with decentralized service networks
because the method explicitly assumes such decentralization
and provides means to represent it and reason about it. More-
over, the method might only be feasible for human analysts
rather than for automated tools, as the analysis rules and
representations are hard to formalize.
We specify the assumptions in a natural-language-like de-
scription. Therefore, unlike HAZOP, we are not limited to a set
of predefined guide words. Instead, we can more informally
investigate the variation of the assumptions by adding/remov-
ing any words.
The ARM method can be applied as soon as the design
of the composite application has completed. Risks can be
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identified before the application is built or the component
services have been implemented. ARM can therefore be used
in an early stage of application development when mistakes
can still be corrected with relatively little cost.
After identifying a risk, we need to reach an agreement
among the service providers on how to prevent/mitigate that
identified risk. Therefore, one/several actors should pay the
cost and to some degree compromise their requirements. To
do so, the requirements of actors should be prioritized. Some
of them, for instance the privacy law, are compulsory and the
service providers must comply. Nevertheless, some others such
as the goal of reducing cost can be negotiated. We can even
inform the stakeholders, for instance the care-givers, about a
risk and if it is acceptable, there would be no need to (re)plan
the application behavior. Instead, we plan end-users behavior
by making them aware of the risk in advance.
Another challenge that we have found in our pilot study
is that after introducing the homecare applications, the end-
users change their behavior because of the new possibilities.
For instance, Jan has not to wait until Nancy comes to his
apartment to measure his blood pressure. Therefore, he often
measures his blood pressure earlier than scheduled time and
goes out to meet his friends. Predicting these type of end-user
behavior as what if scenarios is not a straightforward task at
the design time.
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